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Introduction
This paper attempts to shed light on two inter-related questions. One is the redistributive properties of monetary policy; the other concerns the optimality of the Friedman rule (hereafter FR) of setting the nominal interest rate to zero (Friedman 1969 ). The two questions are related in that the monetary policy a¤ects redistribution through the monetary growth rate as well as money disbursement rule. The setting that we consider is a Mirrleesian optimal tax framework wherein available tax instruments are rationalized by what are considered the most realistic assumptions about the structure of information in the economy. The novelty of our approach is to allow for two sources of heterogeneity among agents. In addition to di¤erences in earning abilities, which is the hallmark of Mirrleesian models, we allow agents to di¤er in the degree of sophistication in handling of, and access to, …nancial markets. Additionally, we do not make any arbitrary assumptions about the individuals'structure of preferences.
The question of redistributive properties of monetary policy is important not only in its own right but also to the resolution of the debate regarding the impropriety of giving redistributive power, which should reside with the legislature, to unelected central bankers. In considering the Mirrleesian approach to address the optimality of the FR, we follow da Costa and Werning (2008) . Their paper represents a refreshing break from the traditional public …nance approach to this question which typically studies the problem in environments with identical individuals. Such environments are, by construct, silent on the validity of FR when monetary policy has redistributive implications. 1 Naturally too, these earlier studies use a Ramsey tax setting and assume that all tax instruments, including the income tax, are set proportionally. 2 Yet, while recognizing the signi…cance of heterogeneity in studying the FR, da Costa and Werning (2008) focus on heterogeneity 1 With the exception of intergenerational redistributive issues that arise in overlapping generations models; see, e.g., Weiss (1980) , Abel (1987) , and Gahvari (1988) . 2 See, e.g., Chari et al. (1991 Chari et al. ( , 1996 , Teles (1996, 1999) , Guidotti and Vegh (1993 in productivities in the labor market but ignore other sources of heterogeneity that are potentially important in this context.
One source is the distinction that Williamson (2008) has made between "connected" and "unconnected" agents in terms of their access to and reliance on …nancial institutions. He shows that this kind of heterogeneity causes monetary policy to have signi…-cant redistributive implications which, in turn, often leads to a negation of the FR. Yet, Williamson does not frame this distinction within an optimal tax framework. As such it is di¢ cult to draw any conclusions for the e¤ects of this type of heterogeneity on the validity of the FR within an optimal tax setting. The current paper is a …rst attempt at studying and providing an answer to this question.
In da Costa and Werning's (2008) Mirrleesian framework, the FR emerges either as an interior or as a corner solution. To put these results in perspective, one should consider that the FR is a …rst-best prescription which may or may not hold in secondbest settings. This depends on the nature of the second-best (existence of distortionary taxes or intrinsic reasons for market failure), the set of tax instruments available to the government, and the structure of individuals' preferences. 3 Chari et al. (1991 Chari et al. ( , 1996 , in the context of a model with identical and in…nitely-lived individuals, related the optimality of FR in the presence of distortionary taxes to the uniform commodity tax result of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972) and Sandmo (1974) . This latter result states that if preferences are separable in labor supply and non-leisure goods, with the subutility 3 Among other authors, Bloise and Polemarchakis (2006), Ireland (2003) , and Rochon and Polemarchakis (2006) showed that zero nominal interest rates constitute a necessary condition for Pareto optimality. The optimality of the FR when lump-sum taxes are not available is more controversial. The non-optimality of the FR in the presence of distortive taxes was …rst discussed by Phelps (1973) . Cunha (2008) investigates whether zero nominal interest rates constitute a feature of optimal policies associated with complete and incomplete tax systems (where a tax system is de…ned incomplete if the number of tax instruments is smaller than the number of wedges). A selective reference to other sources of distortion include: van der Ploeg and Alogoskou…s (1994) for an externality underlying endogenous growth; Ireland (1996) for monopolistic competition; Erceg et al. (2000) and Khan et al. (2003) for nominal wage and price settings; Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a,b) for imperfections in the goods market; Lai and Chin (2010) for imperfections in the (world) capital markets; and Shaw et al. (2006) for imperfect competition as well as externality.
for goods being homothetic, optimal commodity taxes are proportionately uniform.
Deviations from the FR violates this tax principle. 4 As with Chari et al. 's (1991, 1996) earlier result, da Costa and Werning's (2008) …nding is also related to the uniform taxation result in public …nance, albeit a di¤erent one. Whereas Chari et al. 's (1991, 1996) draws on Sandmo's tax uniformity (1974) result derived within a Ramsey setting, da Costa and Werning's (2008) has its roots in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) . That classic paper on the design of tax structures was particularly concerned with the usefulness of commodity taxes in the presence of a general income taxes in many-consumer economies. 5 It proved that with a general income tax, if preferences are weakly separable in labor supply and non-leisure goods, commodity taxes are not needed as instruments of optimal tax policy. The preference separability implies a zero nominal interest rate and underlies da Costa and Werning's (2008) result as an interior solution.
With non-separability, one wants to tax the goods that are "substitutes"with labor supply and subsidize those that are "complements" with labor supply. 6 
da Costa and
Werning assume that real cash balances and labor supply are complements so that cash balances should be subsidized. This implies that the optimal nominal interest rate is 4 This uniformity result is derived within the context of the traditional one-consumer Ramsey problem. As such, the result embodies only e¢ ciency considerations. Redistributive goals play no role. 5 The ine¤ectiveness of commodity taxes and their proportionately uniform tax treatment boil down to the same thing. In the absence of exogenous incomes, the government has an extra degree of freedom in setting its income and commodity tax instruments. This is because all demand and supply functions are homogeneous of degree zero in consumer prices and lump-sum income. In consequence, the government can, without any loss of generality, set one of the commodity taxes at zero (i.e. set one of the commodity prices at one). Under this normalization, uniform rates imply absence of commodity taxes. 6 The result is based on the "normal"assumption that the socially desirable direction of redistribution goes from high-skilled to low-skilled agents. The substitutability/complementarity relationships allow commodity taxes/subsidies to weaken otherwise binding self-selection constraints. As Stiglitz (2015, p. 42) writes: "what the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem illustrates is that in the presence of an (optimal) income tax, ... commodity taxation can be viewed as a particular type of Pigouvian corrective tax. The focus is not on the impact on tax revenues, or even directly on dead weight losses (as usually conceived), but on impacts on the self-selection constraints that are central to the design of the optimal income tax. 'Loosening' the self-selection constraints has a …rst order e¤ect on welfare, while the distortions associated with small commodity taxation have a second order e¤ect on welfare." negative. But given the non-negativity of nominal interest rate, the FR emerges as the "optimal" policy. The question then is what justi…es da Costa and Werning's complementarity assumption. The justi…cation appears to come from "the notion, stressed by various theories, that money's liquidity services facilitate transactions and save on the time required for purchases" (da Costa and Werning, 2008, p. 83). However, the chosen complementarity assumption does not lead to or explain the empirical regularity found in the literature to the e¤ect that the lower income consumers carry a higher percentage of their expenditures in cash. 7 Indeed, as Albanesi (2007) points out, the complementarity assumption exploited by da Costa and Werning "would lead to a crosssectional distribution of money holdings that is inconsistent with empirical evidence" (p. 38). And, without recourse to this assumption, the optimality of the FR remains questionable.
We account for the negative cross-sectional correlation between money holdings and labor income by explicitly modeling it as the outcome of the "connectedness" heterogeneity that Williamson (2008) proposed while remaining agnostic about the structure of individuals' preferences (i.e. complementarity or substitutability of real balances with labor supply). As Williamson pointed out, individuals relying more on …nancial instruments, require to carry less cash to …nance their transactions. One can think of two mechanisms for the ability to fully exploit …nancial institutions. One is a person's actual income level. There is abundant empirical evidence that wealthier people, in developed and developing countries alike, have wider access to …nancial institutions; see, e.g., Johnson and Sherraden (2007) . A second mechanism that likely plays a role is an individual's "…nancial acumen" (by which we mean both one's innate ability in this 7 See, e.g., Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000), Erosa and Ventura (2002) , and Guiso et al. (2001) . The complementarity assumption only tells us that if a high-ability consumer and a low-ability consumer were to earn the same gross-of-tax income and the same net-of-tax income, the high-ability consumer (whose labor supply is lower since his wage rate is higher) would carry a smaller amount of real cash balances than the low-ability consumer. It does not tell us if, in equilibrium, a high-ability person (earning a higher income than a low-ability individual) will in fact carry a smaller amount of real cash balances, as a percentage of his total expenditures, than a low-ability consumer. particular dimension as well as one's …nancial literacy). 8 Indeed, Johnson and Sherraden (2007) recognize and document both of the two mechanisms mentioned under "access to …nancial institutions and services" and "…nancial knowledge" (with the two elements forming what they call "…nancial capability"). 9 Similarly, in its Policy Brief (July 2006), the OECD reports that "The information available on consumer …nancial literacy is worrying"; it further adds that "The level of …nancial literacy tends to vary according to education and income levels, but the evidence shows that highly educated consumers with high incomes can be just as ignorant about …nancial issues as less educated, lower income consumers". 10 Naturally, one expects one's …nancial acumen to be positively correlated with one's earning ability and productivity. 11 Modeling di¤erences in …nancial connectedness directly, obviates the need to import forced assumptions that will have their own artifacts. Indeed, if "money's liquidity services facilitate transactions and save on the time required for purchases", as da Costa and Werning (2008) argue, one would expect the rich and more able individuals to want to carry relatively more cash, not less. Their time is after all more valuable and productive than the poor and less-able individuals'.
To model …nancial connectedness as a second source of heterogeneity, we rationalize money holdings through a Clower cash-in-advance constraint that allows for the cash reserve requirement to di¤er across agents. Individuals who are more …nancially sophisticated are postulated to require a smaller fraction of their expenditures to be …nanced through cash reserves. This fraction is also assumed to vary inversely with one's earned 8 Mirrleesian models, being static in nature, do not explicitly model the role that education plays in the outcome. In postulating that earnings are simply the product of earning ability and e¤ort (labor supply), one subsumes the role of education in one's "innate abilities" (boosting it up). 9 That …nancial sophistication is not identical to access is supported by other type of evidence as well. For example, Kotliko¤ and Bernheim (2001) report that having an allowance and a bank account in childhood leads to more savings in adulthood.
1 0 The Policy Brief also mentions that OECD is advancing a project entitled "Improving Financial Literacy" and has suggested ten speci…c guidelines for improving …nancial literacy. 1 1 Of course, given that in equilibrium higher earning abilities are translated into higher earnings, the two mechanisms are interrelated. Yet, as we will see later in Section 6, the two are not the same and each has its own distinct implication.
income. 12 Another di¤erence between our setup and the one considered by da Costa and Werning (2008) is that we use an overlapping-generations (hereafter OLG) framework instead of an in…nitely-lived cohort of agents. This allows us avoiding certain technical di¢ culties while concentrating on our main points. However, as the "golden rule" literature has taught us, in the OLG models one can always exploit the di¤erence between the real interest rate and the population growth rate to raise the steady-state welfare through intergenerational wealth transfers. 13 Distortionary commodity taxes achieve this. An in ‡ation tax, i.e. deviating from the FR, is one such mechanism. 14 However, this reason for the suboptimality of the FR has nothing to do with the heterogeneity of agents or with the existence of Mirrleesian taxes (the issues of interest in this paper). Thus, to avoid distraction caused by this obvious source of suboptimality, when discussing the optimality of the FR in our setup, we shall assume that the economy is at the golden rule.
A number of lessons emerge from our analysis. First, regarding the role of income and commodity taxes, we distinguish between two monetary mechanisms that can a¤ect redistribution. One concerns who gets the extra money. The other is associated with the rate of growth of money supply. We show that a nonlinear income tax can always neutralize the …rst mechanism. On the other hand, the tax policy can neutralize the second redistributive channel only in the absence of di¤erences in …nancial connectedness.
Second, absent di¤erences in …nancial connectedness, we show there is instrument 1 2 We …nd the cash-in-advance constraint formulation to be the simplest mechanism for introducing a second source of heterogeneity into the model. This is in contrast to da Costa and Werning (2008) who rationalize money holdings via introducing real cash balances in the agents' utility functions. These "reduced-form" formulations are the literature's two most commonly used environments for studying the optimality of the FR. 1 3 The terminology and the original formulation of the golden rule, in the context of the neoclassical growth model, is due to Phelps (1961) . For discussions in the context of OLG model, see, among others, Diamond (1965) and Hamada (1972) . 1 4 This result was …rst demonstrated by Weiss (1980) . Later, Gahvari (1988) showed that the existence of generation-speci…c lump-sum taxes makes the use of such distortionary taxes unnecessary and restores the optimality of the FR.
"over-determination". That is, the optimal monetary growth rate is not unique; a continuum of values satis…es it (supported by o¤setting tax instruments). To have a unique optimal monetary growth rate, commodity taxation must be ruled out. Under this circumstance, the FR holds as a unique interior solution if preferences are separable in labor supply. It will also hold as a corner solution if labor supply and second-period consumption are complements.
Third, with di¤erences in …nancial connectedness, the over-determinacy disappears and the optimal policy is characterized by a unique commodity tax rate and a unique monetary growth rate. Provided that labor supply and second-period consumption are substitutes, it might then be optimal to violate the FR. However, for this to happen one also needs that the di¤erences in …nancial connectedness are to a su¢ ciently large extent explained by di¤erences in income (rather than by an underlying heterogeneity in …nancial sophistication).
The model
Consider a two-period OLG model wherein individuals work in the …rst period and consume in both. There is no bequest motive. Preferences are represented by the strictly quasi-concave utility function U = u (c t ; d t+1 ; L t ) where c denotes consumption in the …rst period, d consumption in the second period, and L denotes the labor supply; subscript t denotes calendar time. The utility function is strictly increasing in c t and d t+1 , and strictly decreasing in L t . Each generation consists of two types of individuals who di¤er in two (positively) correlated characteristics: earning abilities (labor productivity) and the degree of "…nancial sophistication". High-productivity workers are paid w h t and low-productivity workers wt ; with w h t > wt . The degree of …nancial sophistication, together with the income earned by a given individual, determines an agent's degree of "…nancial connectedness". This is modeled by the relative size of the cash one has to carry for …nancing his transactions. The proportion of agents of type j; j ; j = h;`, remains constant over time. Denote the number of young agents of type j born in period t by n j t and the total number of young agents by N t . We have n j t =N t = j . While j remains constant, population grows over time at a constant rate, g.
Production takes place through a linear technology with di¤erent types of labor as inputs. Transfer of resources to the future occurs only through a storage technology with a …xed (real) rate of return, r. 15 We thus work with an OLG model à la Samuelson (1958) and assume away the issues related to capital accumulation.
Money and monetary policy
Money holdings, rationalized through a Clower cash-in-advance constraint, constitute another source of …nancing for future consumption (in addition to real savings). At the beginning of period t; before consumption takes place, the young purchase all the existing stock of money, M t ; from the old. Denote a young j-type agent's purchases by
The rate of return on money holdings (the nominal interest rate), i t+1 ; is related to the in ‡ation rate, ' t+1 ; according to the Fisher equation
Denote the price level at time t by p t ; the in ‡ation rate is de…ned as
The monetary authority injects money into (or retires money from) the economy at the constant rate of . 16 The formulation below is based on the "assumption" that the 1 5 An alternative assumption is that agents borrow and lend on international capital markets at an exogenously …xed interest rate. 1 6 Given a positive real interest rate, in the absence of population growth, will have to be negative for the nominal interest rate to be zero as required by the FR. With population growth, the FR is compatible with a positive (as well as a negative ). Either way, the fact that the nominal interest rate cannot be negative sets a lower bound on . money is given to (or taken from) the old-who hold all the stock of money. Let a j t+1 denote the amount of money that a j-type agent, who purchases m j t at the beginning of time t, "receives" at the beginning of period t + 1. Clearly, a h t+1 and at +1 must satisfy the "money injection relationship",
Beyond this, we do not specify how much of the extra money injection goes to which type. Indeed, one message of our paper is to prove that this division is immaterial.
Following Hahn and Solow (1995) , specify the cash-in-advance constraint through the assumption that all agents must …nance a certain fraction of their second-period consumption expenditures by the cash balances saved in the …rst period. 17 However,
given our heterogeneous-agents framework, this fraction is allowed to depend on an individual's type as well as on his earned income. Speci…cally, let I denote earned income and let j (I) denote the fraction of a j-type's second-period consumption expenditures that has to be …nanced by cash balances when earning I. One can write his cash-inadvance constraint by, 18
An interesting feature of the cash-in-advance constraint approach to modeling money holdings is that it can be tweaked in a natural way to account for the kind of heterogeneity Williamson (2008) has identi…ed. His notion of connectedness can be captured 1 7 This speci…cation has been used extensively in overlapping-generations models, particularly by Philippe Michel and his associates; see, e.g., Crettez et al. (1999 Crettez et al. ( , 2002 and Wigniolle (2003, 2005) . This speci…cation may appear restrictive in that it does not apply to …rst-period consumption expenditures. However, this is not the case for the points addressed in this paper. Assuming that …rst-period expenditures are also subject to this constraint does not change our results. Given that individuals have no assets in the …rst-period, they will have to borrow money from the old, at the market interest rate, and as such imposes no additional constraint on the individuals' optimization problem. See Gahvari (2012) for more details on what might change if one adopts this more generalized speci…cation for the cash-in-advance constraint. 1 8 With the additional restriction that m
is not necessarily equal to (1 + g) m j t+1 . This will be the case only if the money disbursement to type j is set according to the rule a through di¤erences in individual characteristics and incomes. On one hand higher productivity goes hand in hand with a higher inherent degree of sophistication on the part of the individual, and the more sophisticated an individual, the higher his knowledge of the …nancial sector and his ability to take advantage of …nancial institutions. At the same time, the more income an individual earns, the more "connections" he makes (higher incomes open more doors). Both of these factors appear to be behind Williamson's concept of …nancial connectedness allowing richer individuals to carry a smaller fraction of their expenditures in cash. Put di¤erently, `( I) > h (I), with @ j (I)=@I < 0 (for j =`; h). Moreover, since at the solution to the government's problem that we present in Section 2.4 the high-productivity individuals earn more than the low-productivity ones, i.e. I h > I`, we will have that ` I` > h I h . 19 
Fiscal policy
Informational frictions play a key role in the Mirrleesian optimal tax approach. The informational structure we posit is the one most commonly used in the optimal tax literature; see, e.g., Edwards et al., (1994) . In particular, we shall assume that an individual's type and labor supply are not publicly observable; hence …rst-best type-speci…c lump-sum taxes are not available and redistribution can be achieved only through distortionary taxation. On the other hand, individual income (I t = w t L t ) is observable so that it can be taxed via a nonlinear tax schedule T (I t ). Moreover, we assume that the tax administration has information on anonymous transactions but not on the identity of the consumers. That is, the administration observes the total sales of a commodity but not who bought how much. This is the standard assumption in the literature so much so that it has been used as part of the very de…nition of indirect taxation. In discussing direct versus indirect taxation, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) write "the essential aspect of the distinction [is] the fact that direct taxes may be adjusted to the individual characteristics of the taxpayer, whereas indirect taxes are levied on transactions irrespective of the circumstances of buyer or seller" (p. 427). This assumption precludes imposition of non-linear commodity taxes. 20 However, linear commodity taxation is feasible. 21 When determining the linear commodity taxes, however, the homogeneity of degree zero of demands in consumer prices and disposable incomes, implies that the tax authority has one extra degree of freedom in setting the commodity tax rates. As long as relative prices of the various goods are kept …xed, any e¤ect of a proportionately uniform increase or decrease in the vector of commodity tax rates can be o¤set via a proper adjustment in the income tax schedule. One of the tax rates can then be set equal to zero without any loss of generality. We set the tax rate on c t equal to zero normalizing its consumer price to one. The tax rate on d t+1 is denoted by . Giving the linearity of the production technology, we also normalize all producer prices to one (by suitable choices of measurement units).
Constrained Pareto-e¢ cient allocations
To characterize the (constrained) Pareto-e¢ cient allocations, one has to account for the economy's resource balance, the incentive compatibility (hereafter IC) constraints due to our informational structure, and the implementability constraints caused by linearity of commodity taxes (itself due to informational constraint) as well as the monetary expansion mechanism. To this end, we derive an optimal revelation mechanism. For our purpose, a mechanism consists of a set of type-speci…c before-tax labor incomes, I j t 's, after-tax incomes, z j t 's, a commodity tax rate, , a money supply growth rate, , and a monetary distributive rule, a j t+1 . 22 This procedure determines ; ; and a j t+1 from the outset. A complete solution to the optimal tax problem per se, i.e. determination of I j t by the individuals via utility maximization, then requires only the design of a general income tax function T (I t ) such that z
To proceed further, it is necessary to consider the optimization problem of an individual for a given mechanism ( ; ; a t+1 ; z t ; I t ). This is necessitated by the fact that the mechanism determines personal consumption levels only indirectly, namely through prices. The mechanism assigns the quintuple ; ; a to a young individual who reports his type as j. 23 The individual will then allocate z j t between …rst-and second-period consumption, and money holdings.
Formally, given any vector ( ; ; a t+1 ; z t ; I t ), an individual of type j chooses c t and
subject to the per-period budget constraints
where s t is the level of real savings chosen by the agent. Observe that does not explicitly appear in the problem above; it does so implicitly through its e¤ect on i t+1 .
Combining equations (7)- (8) we can write the intertemporal budget constraint for 2 2 Observe that the monetary authority has only two degrees of freedom in setting at +1 ; a h t+1 and . Setting any two of these three variables …xes the third through equation (4) . 2 3 If the money disbursements to skilled and unskilled workers were set according to a j t+1 = m j t , then once is determined, so will a j t+1 . The revelation mechanism will then be reduced to a quadruple ; ; z 
The problem of a young j-type, who is facing the quintuple ; ; a j t+1 ; z j t ; I j t , is to determine c t ; d t+1 , and m t to maximize (6) subject to (9) and the cash-in-advance constraint (5) . Summarizing this problem by the Lagrangian,
the …rst-order conditions are:
Assuming the cash-in-advance constraint (5) 
2 4 Substitute zt ct mt=pt for st from (7) into (8) to derive,
Divide the above expression by pt+1 (1 + r) and rearrange.
Writing the binding version of the Clower cash-in-advance constraint as, 26
we can incorporate (14) into the intertemporal budget constraint (9) to rewrite it as 27
Condition (13) and the young j-type's intertemporal budget constraint (15) , using the de…nition of q j t+1 in (13), yield the following conditional demands for the j-type's …rst-and second-period consumption, 28
The j-type's holding of cash, m j t , is then determined through equation (14) . These are of course conditional on the values of ; ; a j t+1 ; z j t ; I j t , j = h;`, the policy parameters to be set by the "mechanism designer". 29 To complete the characterization of the set of (constrained) Pareto-e¢ cient allocations, what is left for us to specify is how the mechanism designer chooses ; ; a 
2 6 Divide (5) by pt+1; rearrange the terms, and use equations (2)-(3). 2 7 Substitute for mt=pt+1; from (14) in the intertemporal budget constraint (9) to get
then rearrange the terms. 2 8 Observe that if there is heterogeneity in cash-in-advance constraint across the types, h 6 = `a nd the two types will face di¤erent e¤ective prices for dt+1 relative to ct: q h t+1 6 = qt +1 . 2 9 To be speci…c, equations (1)- (3), equations (13)- (15) for j =`; h, and the de…nition of q j t+1 in (13) for j =`; h, give us eleven equations for determining c To write the IC constraints, we should also know what fraction of his second-period consumption expenditures a j-type who may want to report his type as k; the so-called "mimicker"(or jk agent), must …nance through cash balances that he saves in the …rst period. This fraction, j I k , depends on the individual's true type j as well as the income he earns when mimicking the other type (i.e. the income I k intended by the planner for agents of type k only). Consistent with the de…nition of q j t+1 (I t ) in (13), a j-type mimicking a k-type will face a price of
for his second-period consumption good. For simplicity, from now on we denote: 
the money injection relationship (4), and the IC constraints
3 0 As observed earlier, one needs to determine only two of the variables at +1 ; a h t+1 and . The third will be determined through equation (4) .
where R is an exogenous per-capita revenue requirement. 31 We will discuss the solution to this problem, and the properties of the solution, after it reaches its steady-state equilibrium as discussed next.
Steady state
The consumers' optimization problem under perfect foresight assumption, given the mechanism ; ; a . Equivalently, given the de…nition of q j t+1 in (13) and using equations (2)
is determined as a function of p t and p t+1 . Consequently, through the binding version of (5), m j t too is determined as a function of p t and p t+1 . 32 Now, in the per-period equilibrium of our model laid out in Section 2, the equality of aggregate money demand and aggregate money supply at time t requires, from equation
Divide this relationship by N t p t and rewrite it as,
With m h t and mt being function of p t and p t+1 , given that ; M t 1 ;and N t are all predetermined variables, equation (23) de…nes a relationship between p t and p t+1 . The dynamics of the model is then described by this equation. The economy reaches a steady-state equilibrium when p t+1 = [(1 + ) = (1 + g)] p t . 33 This implies, using the 3 1 Observe that (20) represents a generational budget constraint as opposed to a per-period budget constraint. 3 2 Dividing the binding version of (5) by pt results in m
)=pt. 3 3 Notice that with the money stock changing at the rate in every period, Mt+1 = (1 + ) Mt, or equivalently, using eq. (1) and taking into account that the population of each type grows at a constant rate g, X j=`;h n j t m j t+1
Given that the price level pt evolves over time in the same way for both types, for both mt=pt and m h t =pt to remain constant over time (i.e. to reach a steady-state level), it must be that the ratios mt +1 =mt and m de…nition of the in ‡ation rate provided by (3) , that the steady-state version of eq. (2) is given by:
In steady state, the mechanism designer assigns I =p t b j ; j = h;`; to whoever states his type to be j. The intertemporal price of the second-period consumption a j-type faces, q j t+1 de…ned by (13) , then takes the following form
Equation (16) (14) and remains constant over time at 34
It follows from this expression that one can write the steady-state version of the money it follows that at a steady-state equilibrium pt+1=pt = (1 + ) = (1 + g). 3 4 We have x j t m j t =pt = m j t =pt+1 (pt+1=pt). Substituting for m j t =pt+1 from (14) yields
injection relationship (4) as 35
For future reference, we also note that the steady-state version of the young j-type's intertemporal budget constraint, eq. (15), is given by
where y j denotes the j-type's aggregate disposable income. Similarly, for a jk mimicker,
we have that the intertemporal budget constraint is given by c jk +q
where
We are now ready to investigate the questions of the redistributive aspects of monetary policy in the presence of Mirrleesian taxes and of the optimality of the FR.
Monetary policy and redistribution
This section examines the redistributive aspects of (i) how the money is injected into the economy and (ii) the rate of money creation. The following Proposition summarizes our results for each case. 3 5 To see this, substitute for Mt from equation (1) into (4) and divide it by Ntpt to get,
In the steady state, a j t+1 =pt tends to b j and m j t =pt to x j , where
and rearranging the terms yields,
Then divide this expression by (1 + ).
Proposition 1 Consider the steady-state equilibrium of our OLG model with cash-inadvance constraint and with heterogeneous agents:
(i) For a given monetary rate of growth, the …scal authority can always o¤ set the redistributive e¤ ects of who gets the extra money (or loses the money that is withdrawn from the economy), by adjusting the nonlinear income tax.
(ii) A change in monetary growth rate changes the relative price of future to present consumption di¤ erently for di¤ erent individuals. The …scal authority cannot neutralize the e¤ ects of such a change in monetary policy.
Proof. To prove part (i), start from any initial value for b h and b`and consider a change in money disbursements equal to db h and db`: Simultaneously, change z j according to dz j = db j : Now, with y j = z j + b j , dy j = 0, and q j ; y j ; I j ; q jk ; y k ; I k remain intact. Hence the utility of all agents in the economy, including those planning to behave as mimickers, remain the same. As a result, the IC constraints continue to be satis…ed if they were satis…ed at the initial equilibrium.
Second, with q j ; y j ; I j remaining unchanged, the j-type's demand for d does not change either. Consequently, the changes in b j imply, from the money injection constraint (27) , that
Third, with d j unchanged, the only change in the government's revenue requirement comes from the changes in z j : Hence, from the steady-state version of (20) and (30),
This shows that the considered changes satisfy all the constraints that the economy faces but leaves every agent as well o¤ as he was before and completes the proof of part (i) of the Proposition.
Turning to part (ii) of the Proposition, now start from any initial value for and change the monetary growth rate by d . To determine how this changes q j , substitute for i from (24) in (25) 
It follows from (31) that dq j j = (1 + r) d . It is then clear that, because of di¤erent values of j , a change in changes q j di¤erently for individuals of di¤erent types. As long as the government has to tax future goods at the same rate for everyone, it will be impossible to o¤set the e¤ect of a change in with a change in : Consequently, this aspect of monetary policy cannot be neutralized with …scal policy.
Regarding the monetary distribution rule, it should not be surprising that it can be rendered impotent in the presence of a nonlinear income tax. Speci…cally, a nonlinear income tax enables the …scal authority to exert full control on z and therefore, as can be seen from (28), on an agent's aggregate disposable income. Consequently, any agent speci…c money injection can be o¤set by the nonlinear income tax. 36 As to the relevance of the monetary growth rate, our method of proof alerts us to the fact that if the …scal authority could tax consumption goods at di¤ erent rates for di¤ erent individuals, it would be able to o¤set the change in q j to both individual types.
This would require departing from the common assumption in the optimal tax literature that the …scal authority has information only on anonymous transactions. Instead, one would need to assume that the …scal authority can observe personal purchases (who purchased how much), so that it can levy nonlinear taxes also in the goods market.
Although the information on personal consumption levels is not typically available, 3 6 This result does not contradict Williamson's (2008) who …nds the monetary expansion rule does matter. Nor is the two di¤erent results due to the fact that in Williamson's setup, there is no …scal authority to try to undo what the monetary authority does. The underlying factor is the distinction he makes between the connected and unconnected agents in terms of their access to …nancial institutions. The impact of this distinction does not show up in b j in our model. Instead, this distinction works through di¤erent 's that the two types face with respect to their cash-in-advance constraints. This, in turn, manifests itself through q j and not b j .
for completeness, we have examined its implications in Appendix C. There we show that with nonlinear commodity taxes the FR is optimal as a corner solution under our assumption that `> h`.
Finally, notice that, even though Proposition 1 and its proof refer to a steadystate equilibrium, the presented results apply more generally also outside a steady-state and for any pre-reform policy package, even suboptimal ones, that satisfy the set of constraints faced by the policy maker (i.e. the constraints (4), and (20)- (22)). 37 
Optimal tax/monetary policy
To characterize the optimal tax/monetary policy, using the mechanism design approach, we follow the common practice in the literature and ignore the "upward" incentive constraint, v` v`h; assuming that it is automatically satis…ed. 38 Thus, the only possible binding constraint will be that of the high-skilled agents mimicking low-skilled agents. Intuitively, this implies that we are concerned only with the realistic case of redistribution from the high-skilled to the low-skilled agents. Focusing on the steadystate equilibrium, the mechanism designer's problem can then be represented as:
X j=`;h j v q j ; y j ; I j w j ; subject to the government's budget constraint,
Relaxing the assumption of a steady-state equilibrium would not alter the structure of the required proof; it would only require a more cumbersome notation to take into account the time indices. 3 8 Given the perfect correlation between skills and …nancial sophistication, the properties of our setting with two sources of heterogeneity reduces to that of a two-group model à la Stiglitz (1982) . In particular, the single-crossing property for the preference structure v y j ; I j =w j ; q j will be satis…ed in the usual manner (i.e. by having, at any point in the (I; y)-space, the indi¤erence curve of a high-skilled agent to be ‡atter than the indi¤erence curve of a low-skilled agent-a condition that is guaranteed if the composite commodity y j is normal). Then there will at most be one binding self-selection constraint. Moreover, the single-crossing property and the incentive-compatibility constraint together imply that I h > I`. A, characterizes the optimal policy with respect to and . 40 Proposition 2 Let h`d enote the marginal utility of income for the h`-mimicker. At 3 9 In focusing on the steady-state utilities we are nor suggesting that the welfare of agents on the transition path does not matter. It is just that considering them does not change the points addressed in our paper and makes the presentation more cumbersome. One can also rationalize our approach by assuming a Millian social welfare function over undiscounted average utilities of all present and future generations.
4 0 Since our focus lies in assessing whether it is optimal or not to abide by the FR, we omit presenting the expressions characterizing the optimal marginal income tax rates faced by high-and low-skilled agents. These expressions are available upon request. the solution to the planner's problem, the optimal values for and satisfy:
h` h`dh`
where (33) is satis…ed as a strict equality if > (g r) = (1 + r).
Eq. (32) and inequality (33) implicitly characterize the optimal values for and by means of a trade-o¤ between two e¤ects arising, respectively, from a compensated marginal increase in and . 41 One is the e¤ects on the IC constraint, represented by the -terms, and the other is public budget e¤ects, represented by the -terms. 42 In particular, the -term in (32) shows that a marginal increase in , coupled with an o¤setting change in the nonlinear income tax schedule aimed at leaving unchanged the utility of low-skilled agents, will adversely a¤ect the utility of a mimicker, and therefore weaken the IC constraint, when d h`> d`. Instead, the -term in (33) shows that a marginal increase in , coupled with an o¤setting change in the nonlinear income tax schedule aimed at leaving unchanged the utility of low-skilled agents, will make a mimicker worse o¤, and therefore weaken the IC constraint, when h`dh`> `d`.
We are now is a position to examine the optimality of the FR. To emphasize the role played by …nancial connectedness, we shall …rst examine a setting without di¤erences in …nancial connectedness. This requires that two conditions are jointly satis…ed: i) there 4 1 A compensated marginal increase in (or ) is de…ned as an increase in (or ) accompanied by an o¤setting change in the nonlinear income tax schedule such that the well-being of every non-mimicking agents is left una¤ected. Formally, this requires adjusting z j by dz j = d j =(1 + r) when is marginally raised and by dz j = j d j =(1 + g) when is marginally raised. 4 2 In reality, part of the -terms in (32)- (33) capture e¤ects on the money-injection constraint. However, due to the fact that an optimizing planner always chooses the policy instruments in such a way as to achieve = (see the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix A for details), one can re-interpret the e¤ect on the money-injection constraint as a public-budget e¤ect. The fact that = tells us that at a social optimum the planner is indi¤erent between raising the utility of type j-agents via a marginal increase in z j or via a marginal increase in b j . This is due to the fact that, at the individual level, the marginal rate of substitution between z j and b j is one; see equation (28) .
is no underlying heterogeneity in …nancial sophistication among agents and ii) …nancial connectedness does not depend on an agent's income.
The FR without di¤erences in …nancial connectedness
Absent di¤erences in …nancial connectedness, h = `= h` . It then follows immediately from Proposition 2 that the optimal values of and are characterized by one single relationship:
This tells us that the optimal monetary growth rate is not unique. Social welfare is maximized by a continuum of values for the monetary growth rate, , and the tax on the second-period consumption, (coupled with supporting income tax rates).
The intuition for this result comes from our earlier discussion on the redistributive implications of the rate of money growth. If h = `= h` , the intertemporal prices are the same across agents. Thus, by properly changing the …scal authority can undo for all agents any e¤ect on q induced by a change in . More precisely (see Appendix A for details), for any change in the money-injection rate one can always …nd a feasible adjustment in the tax rate on second-period consumption and the nonlinear income tax that leaves everybody's welfare intact. An implication of this is that the optimal monetary growth rate is not unique; a continuum of values satis…es it.
From the result above it also descends that, absent commodity taxation, one can escape the instrument over-determination. Without as a control variable, the …scal authority cannot neutralize the redistributive e¤ects of monetary growth rate. One can then ask if in this case the FR is desirable. With constrained to be equal to zero, the government's optimization problem discussed in Section 4 is modi…ed slightly.
Speci…cally, exclude from the set of policy instruments but otherwise keep the problem unchanged. This results in a characterization of optimal given by: 43
where (34) is satis…ed as an equality if its right-hand side is greater than (g r) = (1 + r);
Assume now that the golden rule condition r = g is satis…ed. 44 From (24) Intuitively, a higher in ‡ation rate imposes on agents a utility loss that is proportional to d; thus, absent di¤erences in …nancial connectedness, d h`< d`implies that a higher in ‡ation rate hurts a low-skilled agent more than a high-skilled mimicker, and therefore is of no help in relaxing the IC constraint.
These results correspond to da Costa and Werning's (2008). In the latter paper, the complementarity assumption concerned labor supply and real balances. However, given 4 3 The optimization problem continues to be summarized by the Lagrangian (A1), but the optimization is carried out with respect to I h ; I`; z h ; z`; b h , and . Consequently, eq. (A7) disappears from the set of …rst-order conditions (A2)-(A9); the rest of the equations remain as previously. This means that eq. (A22), and with it eq. (A24), disappear. On the other hand, (A23) and thus (A25) remain. To sum up, relationship (33) applies but in a simpli…ed version with h = `= h`a nd = 0. 4 4 As discussed in the introduction, in OLG models one can always exploit the di¤erence between the real interest rate and the population growth rate to raise the steady-state welfare through intergenerational wealth transfers. Distortionary commodity taxes achieve this. An in ‡ation tax, is one such mechanism. Yet, this reason for the suboptimality of the FR has nothing to do with the heterogeneity of agents or with the existence of Mirrleesian taxes. Thus, to avoid distraction caused by this obvious source of suboptimality, hereafter we assume that the economy is at the golden rule. 4 5 This follows from the fact that with weakly-separable preferences, the h-type who pretends to be an`-type and the`-type have identical after-tax incomes and identical marginal rates of substitution between goods (independent of leisure). They also face the same prices for all goods including d (because `= h`) . that in our cash-in-advance constraint model, real balances are proportional to secondperiod consumption expenditures, the two assumptions amount to the same thing. The crucial point though is that the assumption is somewhat forced and unwarranted in our model. Proposition 3 summarizes the results of this section.
Proposition 3 Assume that di¤ erential productivities are the only source of heterogeneity and that …nancial connectedness does not depend on earned income, so that h = `= h`= . In the steady-state equilibrium:
(i) The …scal authority is able to neutralize the e¤ ects of a change in . Under this circumstance, the optimal monetary growth rate is not unique.
(ii) Set = 0. At the golden rule, the optimal value of = i is characterized by relationship (34) . Then: 
The FR with di¤erences in …nancial connectedness
We now turn to examining the optimality of the FR when allowing for di¤erences in …nancial connectedness. As a basis for the discussion, Lemma 1, proved in Appendix A, provides a characterization for the optimal and the optimal .
Lemma 1 Let:
where the indicated signs come from the fact that, with e d j ; j = h;`denoting compensated demand, @ e d j =@q j < 0. Then, at the golden rule when r = g:
if the constraint = i 0 is non-binding; otherwise, with a binding constraint, one has a corner solution for with,
As explained at the end of Section 2.1, building on Williamson's (2008) contribution, we regard …nancial connectedness as being jointly determined by the income earned by a given individual and by his inherent degree of …nancial sophistication, interpreted as an individual characteristic distinct from earning ability but positively correlated with it. With `( I) > h (I) and j (I) decreasing in I, and considering that in equilibrium I`< I h (see footnote 38), it then immediately follows that ` ` I` > h I h h .
When it comes to h`, we have the more-productive h-type person earning I`, the lower income of the less-productive`-type person. The two properties of j (I), j =`; h, then imply that, ` I` > h I` > h I h , i.e.,
Armed with Lemma 1, and in light of condition (42), we are now in a position to examine the optimality of the FR when …nancial connectedness matters. Proof. To prove (a), rewrite given by (36) as To prove (b), consider the expression for in (36) .
then < 0, and hence from Lemma 1, we have a corner solution for . On the other hand, if h`dh` `d`> 0, can take a positive value so that the FR is violated; but it can also take a non-positive value implying that the FR is satis…ed. This is shown through numerical examples in Appendix B.
To shed light on the results of Proposition 4, observe …rst that in general one wants to use both instruments and ; each has its own advantage. This is best seen by considering the optimal allocation that results under a general income tax when both and are constrained to be zero. Then note the e¤ect on the IC constraint of a compensated increase in , i.e. the e¤ect of introducing an in ‡ation tax coupled with an o¤setting change in the nonlinear income tax schedule aimed at leaving unchanged the utility of all non-mimicking agents. This requires supplementing d > 0 with dz`= `d1
For the reform to make the mimicker worse o¤, and therefore relax the IC constraint, it must be that h`dh`> `d`. With `> h`, this represents a stronger condition than d h`> d`, which is the condition required for a compensated increase in to relax the IC constraint (the considered reform package would be in this
The reason why we get a more demanding condition is that an increase in raises q`and q h`u niformly, whereas an increase in has the unattractive feature of raising q`more than q h`. This aspect represents an advantage of acting on , rather than violating the FR, as an instrument to relax the IC constraint. At the same time, while necessarily distorts q`and q h to the same extent, an in ‡ation tax can generate any intended upward distortion on q( intended for the purpose of relaxing the IC constraint) with a smaller distortion on q h (because `> h ). Given that any distortion on q h constitutes a pure e¢ ciency loss (without bene…ts in terms of relaxing the IC constraint), this aspect explains why, when h`dh`> `d`, it might be desirable to violate the FR rather than to raise , and this despite the fact that violating the FR determines a regressive pro…le of second-period consumption taxes.
Yet, whereas can freely take either a positive or a negative value, this is not the case with which faces a lower bound of zero. This constraint on implies that the FR can only be violated if the required distortion is to set at a positive value. Now when d h` d`, the distortion requires setting a negative value for ; hence satisfaction of the FR as a corner solution. The same is true with d h`> d`and h`dh` `d`6 0.
On the other hand, with h`dh` `d`> 0, the distortion can go either way resulting in the possibility of the FR being violated.
To summarize, when h`dh` `d`> 0 both a commodity tax on second-period consumption and an in ‡ation tax can be used as instruments to relax the binding IC constraint. However, by distorting the intertemporal price of consumption, these policy instruments entail an e¢ ciency cost in terms of foregone revenue due to substitution e¤ects. Of the two instruments, while a commodity tax is more e¤ective as a mimickingdeterring device, it also entails a larger e¢ ciency cost. 46 Thus, when the latter e¤ect dominates, an in ‡ation tax will be part of the optimal policy. n the absence of di¤erences in …nancial connectedness-to ensure that it always holds. 4 6 This is apparent by looking at eqs. (32)- (33) in Proposition 1 which implicitly provide the optimal values for and . In each equation, the -term captures a mimicking deterring e¤ect and the -term a public budget e¤ect due to substitution e¤ects from changing the intertemporal price of consumption. In eq. (32) the e¤ects are those arising from a marginal compensated increase in , whereas in (33) the e¤ects are those arising from a marginal compensated increase in . When h`dh` `d`> 0 we have that both the -term in (32) and the one in (33) take a positive sign, indicating that both a marginal compensated increase in and a marginal compensated increase in deliver gains in terms of mimicking-deterring e¤ects. However, since (0 <) h`< `( 1), we have that the gains generated by acting on are larger than those generated by raising . On the other hand, comparing the -terms in (32) and (33), which represent the e¢ ciency cost (in terms of foregone revenue) due to the substitution e¤ects induced by distorting the intertemporal price of consumption, we can see that the term appearing in (33) is smaller (in absolute value) than the one in (32).
Finally, observe that the source of …nancial connectedness also plays a role in the results. To see this, consider two limit cases: (i) di¤erences in …nancial connectedness are only due to an underlying heterogeneity in …nancial sophistication among agents (earned income plays no role in itself); (ii) di¤erences in …nancial connectedness are only due to di¤erences in earned income (no underlying heterogeneity in …nancial sophistication among agents). 47 Under (i), h`= h < `w hich simpli…es (43) to
Consequently, in this limit case, the FR is always optimal as a corner solution, and the optimal value for is determined according to eq. (41), and therefore sign ( ) =
and therefore sign ( ) = sign d h` d` , implying that it will be desirable to violate
When this happens, the optimal value for is determined according to (39) and sign ( ) = sign ( ). With h`= `, (37) simpli…es to
which implies that sign ( ) = sign d` d h` , and therefore < 0. 48 4 7 In the second case agents are only heterogeneous along one innate characteristic (earning ability), although in equilibrium, since high-skilled agents earn more than low-skilled agents, the former end up being more …nancially connected than the latter. 4 8 Notice that the optima can never be positive when h`= `. We have in fact already established
On the other hand, if it were the case that d Finally, notice that, leaving aside the limit case when h`= `, it is not necessarily true that one should have < 0 when it is desirable to violate the FR. This can be easily seen by rewriting the expression for given by (37) as
and noticing that @ =@ h`= d h`P j=`;h j j @ e d j @q j < 0. Thus, as h`l owers, increases, implying that the optimal can either be positive or negative when it is desirable to violate the FR.
Summary and conclusion
This paper has modeled an OLG economy à la Samuelson (1958) with money wherein cash holdings are rationalized by a version of the Clower cash-in-advance constraint.
A distinguishing feature of the model is that it has allowed for agents to di¤er both in terms of labor productivity and in terms of …nancial connectedness. Some agents are more skilled and more …nancially connected than others. This means that they not only have a higher earning ability, but also require a proportionately smaller cash reserve to mediate their expenditures. Money supply increases, or contracts, at a …xed rate per year through lump-sum money transfers to individuals. The government has information on individuals' incomes and anonymous expenditures; allowing it to levy nonlinear income and linear commodity taxes. Within this framework, the paper has studied the nature of the economy's equilibrium as well as its steady state. It has also characterized the informationally constrained Pareto-e¢ cient allocations of this economy, and has investigated if these allocations satisfy the FR.
The paper has established a link between optimal monetary policy and the reach of …scal authority's tax instruments. It has found that Mirrleesian taxes can fully neutralize the redistributive e¤ects of monetary policy only if agents do not di¤er in …nancial connectedness. In this case, there will exist instrument "over-determination".
That is, the optimal monetary growth rate is not unique; a continuum of values satis…es it (supported by o¤setting tax instruments).
With di¤erences in …nancial connectedness, the over-determinacy disappears and the optimal policy is characterized by a unique commodity tax rate and a unique monetary growth rate. It also results in the FR being quite robust without having to impose arbitrary assumptions on the structure of preferences (though almost always as a corner solution). Yet if labor supply and second-period consumption are substitutes, it might be optimal to violate the FR, and this despite the fact that the government aims at redistributing from the high-skilled agents to the low-skilled agents and the fact that violating the FR determines a regressive pro…le of second-period consumption taxes.
However, for the FR to be violated, substitutability between labor supply and secondperiod consumption is not a su¢ cient condition; one also needs that the di¤erences in …nancial connectedness are to a su¢ ciently large extent explained by di¤erences in income rather than by an underlying heterogeneity in …nancial sophistication (interpreted as an individual characteristic correlated with earning ability but distinct from it).
The intuition for this result comes from the fact that, even when an in ‡ation tax can help relaxing the binding incentive-compatibility constraint faced by the government in the design of the income tax schedule, a commodity tax represents a more powerful instrument for mimicking-deterring purposes. On the other hand, the e¢ ciency costs (in terms of foregone revenue for the government) due to the substitution e¤ects are lower when the intertemporal price of consumption is distorted through an in ‡ation tax rather than through a commodity tax. When the latter e¤ects dominates, which happens when the di¤erences in …nancial connectedness are to a su¢ ciently large extent explained by di¤erences in income rather than by an underlying heterogeneity in …nancial sophistication, violating the FR becomes desirable.
To conclude, we should emphasize that the paper has completely ignored the macro-economic issues associated with monetary and …scal policies. Questions such as stabilization, unemployment, sticky prices, and the like have not been touched in this study not because they are unimportant, but simply because they are outside the purview of the current study. 49 Appendix A Proof of Proposition 2: Using v j to denote v q j ; y j ; I j =w j and v jk to denote v q jk ; y k ; I k =w j , the mechanism designer's problem can be summarized by means of the Kuhn-Tucker Lagrangian:
with the non-negativity constraint g r 1+r
0. The …rst-order conditions associated with Lagrangian (A1) are:
where comparing equation (A4) with (A6) reveals that = :
Now substitute for i from (24) in (29) to get
Di¤erentiate equations (31) and (A10) with respect to and to get
Using @d j =@ = @d j =@q j @q j =@ and @d j =@ = @d j =@q j @q j =@ , one …nds
Let j and jk denote the j-and jk-type agents'marginal utility of income:
Di¤erentiate v j and v jk with respect to and . Using equations (A11)-(A13) and 
where (A25) is satis…ed as an equality if > (g r) = (1 + r). Using the Slutsky equation, one can rewrite (A25) as (33) in the text.
Policy over-determination when there are no di¤erences in …nancial connectedness: Observe …rst that with j = , from (31), q j simpli…es to
Consider now, starting from any initial values for and , a change in the growth rate of money equal to d while o¤setting it with a corresponding change in that keeps q constant. It follows from (A26) that one has to set
in order to have dq = 0:
Next observe that the change in induces a change in b j as well. As in the Proof of Proposition 1, let the …scal authority also change z j according to dz j = db j . This change ensures that dy j = dz j + db j = 0: With dy j = dq j = 0 and no change in I j ; the instituted changes leave the utility of the h-types and the`-types intact. Observe also that the utility of potential mimickers, the jk-agents, remain una¤ected as they continue to face the same price and income vector q; y k ; I k . Consequently, the IC constraints continue to be satis…ed. Thus, if the considered changes do not violate the government's budget constraint, they constitute a feasible change that leaves every agent just as well o¤ as initially.
To check that the government's budget constraint is not violated, note that with q; y j ; I j remaining unchanged, the j-type's demand for d does not change either.
With dd j = 0, the change in the government's net tax revenue is, from the steady-state version of (20),
Substituting db j for dz j and the value of d from (A27) in above, we get
Now note that the changes in and b j must satisfy the money injection constraint equation (27) . Given that dd j = 0; we have
Substituting from (A29) into (A28) results in dR = 0:
Proof of Lemma 1: Write equation (32) and the equality version of (33) in matrix form as P
The determinant of the 2 2 matrix in the left-hand side of (A30) is
which is positive since e d j denote the j-type's compensated (Hicksian) demand for second period consumption, so that @ e d j =@q j represents the own-price substitution e¤ect and is therefore negative. Premultiplying (A30) by the inverse of the 2 2 matrix, and using the notation
which lead to (39)-(38) when r = g.
Appendix B: Numerical examples
Assume we are at a steady state and that skilled and unskilled workers have identical preferences represented by
Observe that in this example u Ld < 0 so that labor supply and future goods are (Edgeworth) substitutes. Further, regarding their cash-in-advance constraints, assume that j (I), j =`; h, is decreasing in I with the following structure:
with `< h so that `( I) > h (I). The government has a (weighted) utilitarian objective function P j=`;h j v j , where j denotes the welfare weights, with `> h . Set h = 0:6 and `= 0:4 so that sixty percent of workers are skilled and forty percent unskilled. Their real wage rates, re ‡ecting their productivities, are set equal to w h = 4
and w`= 2. Assume further that r = g = 0:4 and that h = 0:4 and `= 0:6. As far as the government's external revenue is concerned, we set R = 0 so that optimal taxes are purely redistributive. Finally, let `= 0:00005, while h and j are allowed to vary. Given the money injection rate of 31:63% and the population growth rate of 40%, one calculates ' = 0:0598. That is, the price level is falling at a rate of 5:98% per period.
Observe also that the marginal income tax rate faced by skilled workers is non-zero, a result that is due to the presence of other policy instruments besides income taxation. 50 The policy instruments result in the following values for the arguments of the utility function and real money balances: The no-distortion at the top result requires that the labor supply of the top skilled agents, type h in our model, be globally undistorted. When the nonlinear income tax is the only policy instrument, the result requires setting the marginal income tax rate faced by top skilled workers to zero. When additional policy instruments are available, the result requires that the marginal e¤ ective tax rate faced by top skilled workers is driven to zero. This in general requires that their marginal income tax rate should not be set to zero (see, for instance, Edwards et al., 1994) . 5 1 While in this example < 0, this is not a general result. One can generate examples of both and being positive. For example, setting h = `= 1:2 and h = 0:0006 yields: = 0:0187; = i = 0:1141.
(ii) The FR holds: 
It follows from this expression that if the …scal authority changes j by
dq j = 0 whenever the monetary authority changes by d : Moreover, observe again that the change in induces a change in b j as well. As in the Proof of Proposition 1, let the …scal authority also change z j according to dz j = db j : This change ensures that dy j = dz j + db j = 0: With dy j = dq j = 0 and no change in I j ; the instituted changes leave the utility of the h-types and the`-types intact.
To check resource feasibility, observe …rst that with q j ; y j ; I j remaining unchanged, the j-type's demand for d does not change either. With dd j = 0, the change in the government's net tax revenue is, from the steady-state version of (20) , while substituting j for ; db j for dz j ; and the value of d j from (B2)
As in the exercises in the text, the changes in and b j must satisfy the money injection constraint equation (27) . Given that dd j = 0; we have
Substituting from (B4) into (B3) results in dR = 0:
It remains for us to check the IC constraints. To that end, consider the expression that one gets for q jk when substitutes k for in (A10). We have 
It then follows from (B5) and (B2) that a change in accompanied by a change in k that keeps q k constant, changes q jk by
As a result, the utility of a jk-mimicker will change according to
where jk denotes the jk-mimicker's marginal utility of income. Now if jk k > 0 setting d > 0 implies that dv jk < 0 and if jk k < 0 setting d < 0 implies that dv jk < 0: Either way, the jk-mimicker can be made worse o¤ allowing a Paretoimproving move.
The upshot of this discussion is that if jk k > 0 a reform that sets d > 0
and changes q jk according to the above relationship will make the jk-mimicker worse o¤ and allows a Pareto-improving move. On the other hand, if jk k < 0 a reform that sets d < 0 allows a Pareto-improving move. Consequently, given this information structure, …scal policy becomes overarching and one would want to either keep in ‡ating the economy or de ‡ating it. Now, given the pattern of binding IC constraint, the relevant sign for us is that of h` `w hich we know is negative. Consequently, a de ‡ationary reform of the type described always increases welfare, resulting in the optimality of the Friedman rule as a limit solution due to the constraint on the non-negativity of the nominal interest rate.
Finally, observe that the indeterminacy problem we have mentioned in the text does not arise here despite the fact that we are enabling the …scal authority to neutralize the redistributive e¤ects of the monetary policy. The reason for this is that, this informational structure allows …scal authority to achieve even more. It can even determine the "virtual" price q jk thus being able to play with IC constraints.
